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QUALIFYING A WITNESS BY
CROSS-EXAMINATION
The 6th Section of the Act of May 23 d, 1887, P. L. 16o, enacts that "Any person who is incompetent, under clause (e) of
Section Five by reason of interest, may nevertheless be called to
testify against his interest, and in that event, he shall become a
fully competent witness for either party." The 7th section of
the same Act directs that "In any civil proceeding, whether or
not it be brought or defended by a person representing the interests of a deceased or lunatic assignor of any thing or contract in
action, a party to the record or a person for whose immediate
benefit such proceeding is prosecuted or defended, or any other
person whose interest is adverse to the party calling him as a witness, may be compelled by the adverse party to testify as if under
cross-examination,' subject to the rules of evidence applicable
to witnesses under cross-examination, and the adverse party calling
such witnesses shall not be concluded by his testimony, but such
person so cross-examined shall become thereby a fully competent
witness for the other party as to all relevant matters, whether or
not these matters were touched upon in his cross-examination;
and also where one of several plaintiffs or defendants, or the person for whose immediate benefit such proceeding is prosecuted or
defended, or such other person having an adverse interest is crossexamined under this section, his co-plaintiffs or co-defendants
1

The Act of March 27th, 1865, P. 1(. 38, authorized any party in a
civil proceeding to compel any adverse party or any person for whose immediate and adverse benefit such action or proceeding is instituted,
prosecuted or defended t6 testify, as a witness in his behalf. The Act
of April 15th, 1869, P. L. 30, contained a similar provision. Neither the
Act of 1865 nor that of 1869 enacted that the cross-examined party
should become a fully competent witness.
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shall thereby become fully competent witnesses on their own behalf as to all relevant matters, whether or not those matters were
touched upon in such cross-examination.
THE STATUTORY EFFECT
By calling an incompetent person under clause (e) of Section
Five, to testify against his interest, he is made by Section 6, a
"fully competent witness for either party," that is, for the party
For the party calling
with whose interest his own is coincident.
him, he must of course already have been competent. He is
made competent by the preceding phrase. By Section Seven,
any person whose interest is adverse to any other person, may by
such person be compelled to testify as if under cross-examination.
The party so cross-examined shall become thereby a fully competent witness for the party other than the one who calls him, as to
all relevant matters, even such as have not been touched on in
the cross-examination.
THE PROCEEDING
The rule that compulsory testifying by a witness by one
party qualifies him to testify for the other party, is applicable in
any civil proceeding; whether the interest of a decedent or of a
lunatic is represented by one of the parties or not. It is applicable, e. g., in assumpsit,' in ejectment,2 under a bill in equity for an
account, 3 in an application to open a judgment, the plaintiff being
It is frequently invoked in the distribution of the estates
dead.'
of the dead, in the Orphans' Court, by or against a creditor or
other claimant, 5 or in controversies over the accounts of executois or administrators.' A husband filing exceptions to the account
'The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 Super. 170; Boyd v. Conshohocken
Mills, 149 Pa. 363; Danley v. Danley, 179 Pa. 170.
2

nauff v. Fryer, 23 Mont. 110.

IWatkins v. Hughes, 206 Pa. 526.
'Salsberg v. Kopcha, 10 Kulp 410.
"Clad's Estate, 214 Pa. 141; Hambleton's Estate, 166 Pa. 500; Davenport's Estate, 4 Kulp 231; Smith's Estate, 22 Lanc. 137; Markey's Estate, 8 York, 95.
OCorson's Estate, 136 Pa. 160; Shadle's Estate. No. 1, 30 Super. 151;

Yeager's Estate, 31 Super. 202; Mothes' Estate, 29 Super. 464; Bracken's Estate, 15 Dist. 71; DeSilver's Estate, 32 Super. 174; Stockham's
FBstate, 6 Dist. 196; Bierly's Estate, 81X 414; White's Estate, 2 Dist.
808;-Weyant's Estate, 11 Dist. 177; Belcher's Estate, 51 Pitts. 174; Markey's Estate, 8 York 95.
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of the administrator of his wife, exceptions to his right to do so,
on the alleged ground that he had deserted his wife, were filed.
He could be made competent to testify that he had not deserted
his wife, by his being called by the persons who contested his
right, and compelled to testify.1
THE PRINCIPLE AT COMMON LAW

While at common law, one party to a suit could not compel
his antagonist to testify, he might call him, and if he yielded and
testified he became fully competent for himself. Indeed, by calling
any person, party or not, the party calling him was said to accredit him, and so to warrant his testimony for the other party.'
If he was interested in favor of the other party, his calling him
was a certificate that he could be expected to speak the truth,
even though it contravened his interest. "By calling him up
and examining him generally as his witness," said Sargeant, "the
plaintiff accredited him as competent and credible, and was afterwards estopped from averring the contrary." The plaintiff called
one of the defendants. The defendants then prepared to examine
him about other matters, and the Court erroneously excluded his
testimony; Gibson, C. J., remarking that the witness' interest
raised a presumption unfavorable to his credibility, asks "but
did not the plaintiff rebut it when he produced him as a witness
worthy of credit and had the benefit of his testimony? Or, did he
assert no more than that he was worthy of credit only when he
testified against his own interest? The man who is honest enough
to declare the whole truth, when it makes against him, will be
honest enough to declare no more than the truth in his own favor.
It would give a party an unjust advantage to let him pick out
particular parts of a witness' testimony and reject the rest, but
the matter does not rest on principle alone; for it is a familiar rule
that a party cannot discredit his own witness or show his incom"Brown's Estate, 36 C. C. 13.
2
Stockton v. Demuth, 7 W. 39. The witness was first called by the
plaintiff. When later the defendant called him, the objection was
niade that he was interested, being special bail in the suit. The Act of
1887, so far as it make a witness generally competent, who has been
called for cross-examination, is simply declaratory of the common lav;
Stockham's Estate, 6 Dist. 196.

4
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petency."' Independently of legislation, then, a witness whether
party' or not' was made competent generally to testify, by being
called by the adversary party; that is, the party against whom he
pfimafacie might be expected and was prepared to testify. The
provision of the Act of May 23 d, 1887, that the calling of the
adverse party or witness qualifies him to be a witness for himself, when a party, or for the person with whose interest his own
is consonant, is, as says Penrose, J., "simply
an extension of a
4
well settled doctrine of the common law."
ADVERSE PARTY'S COMPELLING TO TESTIFY

The Act of 1887 says that a person may be "compelled by
the adverse party to testify as if under cross-examination, subject
to the rules of evidence applicable to witnesses under cross-examination," and the "person so cross-examined shall become
thereby a fully competent witness for the other party," etc. One
of the rules in Pennsylvania applicable to cross-examination is,
that it must not transcend the scope of the examination in chief,
except with respect to matters affecting the bias or other qualities
of the witness which tend to impair his credibility. This rule is
not capable of being observed when, e. g., a plaintiff calls a defendant or other hostile person before such defendant or person has
been called by himself or by the party towards whom he is favorable. A plaintiff may call a defendant, ' a defendant may call a
plaintiff who has not testified,' either party may call a person
who would not be competent, because of interest, to testify, and
who therefore has not testified for the opposite party, and so make
him competent thus to testify. One of the characteristics of a
cross-examination is that the examiner may use leading questions. This privilege attaches to the so-called cross-examination
(which has not been preceded by an examination) of the Act of
'Floyd v. Bovard, 6 W. & S. 75; Turner v. Watterson, 4 W. & S.
171.

2

Meredith v. Thomas, 4 Kulp. 505; Seip v. Storch, 52 Pa. 210; Bennett v. Williams, 57 Pa. 404; Forrester v. Kline, 64 Pa. 29.
$Turner v. Watterson, 4 W. & S. 171.
4
Weyant's Estate, 11 Dist. 177.
'Watkins v. Hughes, 206 Pa. 526.
OBoyd v. Conshohocken Mills, 149 Pa. 363; Brubaker V. Taylor,

76 Pa. 83; Danley v. Danley, 179 Pa. 170.
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188.7, and of its predecessors, the Act of April 15th, i869, P. L.
30, and the Act of March 27th, 1865.
Of a plaintiff thus called,

Sharswood, J., remarked, "It is evident that she was to be considered in all respects as if originally offered and examined as a
witness in her own behalf." Defendant had "a right to examine
her as if under cross-examination-put to her leading questionsand draw from her any facts or admissions which would corroborate their own case or weaken hers." 1 Calling in the Orphans'
Court the claimant against the estate of a dead man for crossexamination concerning matters prior to the death of the debtor
makes him competent for himself as to his transactions with the
decedent.2 Those who wished to surcharge the accountant with
certain bonds which he alleged the decedent had given him, called
him for cross-examination regarding affairs prior to the death of
the deceased. He thus became fully competent. ' Also, in the
Common Pleas, if one party represents the interest of a dead man,
his calling the opposite party as to matters prior to death will
qualify him fully to testify. 4
CROSS-EXAMINATION IN THE STRICT SENSE
MAY QUALIFY

Not only may one party call for cross-examination an adverse
party or witness who has not already testified, and so qualify him
generally. When such adverse party or witness being competent
as to some matters, and incompetent as to other matters, is called
by the party to whom he is favorable to testify concerning matters
of the former class, he may, in the strict sense, be cross-examined
concerning those matters without affecting his competency as
respects the matters of the latter class. But the cross-examination may be made to extend to matters relating to the latter class.
When this is done, the witness must be regarded as if he had
been called as for this cross-examination, and the effect will be
that the incompetency of the witness with regard to all matters ot
this class will be abrogated. An illustration is furnished by
'Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83.
2
Smith's Estate, 22 Lanc. 137; Root's Estate, 11 Lanc. 225; Corson's
Estate, 137 Pa. 160.
3
Stockham's Estate, 6 Dist. 196; White's Estate, 2 Dist. 808; Zichhorn's Estate, 7 C. C. 433; 24 W. N. 364.
'Watkins v. Hughes, 206 Pa. 526; Danley v. Danley, 179 Pa. 170.

6
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Hambleton's 1state.' A claimed compensation from the estate
of her deceased father-in-law for the expenses of the funeral and
for board furnished him prior to his death. With respect to the
latter, her husband, B, was incompetent, but he was competent
with respect to the former. He was called by her attorney to testify, and did testify, concerning the funeral expenses. He could
have been legitimately cross-examined upon the same subject,
without qualifying him to testify in respect to ante-mortem matters. The counsel for the estate, however, intentionally elicited
from him, by his cross-examination, the statement that he had
done business for his father after the latter came to live with him,
that the father never paid anything for his board, that a certain
check endorsed by the father had been given to him by the father,
on a disputed account, etc. This extension of the cross-examination beyond the post-mortem topics was held to make A's husband competent to testify fully as to the boarding contract made
by his father with his wife, and the board furnished in performance of it. "He was called." said Hemphill, J., "by Mr. Ramsay
to testify to matters occurring since the death of his father, but
Mr. Harris [counsel for the estate], upon cross-examination, examined relative to matters prior to decedent's death, thus making
him a competent witness for all purposes, and the evidence subsequently adduced was in our opinion properly admitted" [by
the auditor]. A residuary devisee, and executrix of the deceased
payee of a note made by a person now deceased, is competent to
testify to matters subsequent to the death of the maker, but not
prior. If, however, after he has testified to matters subsequent,
the counsel for the estate examines him in regard not simply to
subsequent, but to prior, matters, he is made a fully competent
witness for the estate of the payee.' If in the Common Pleas a
witness testifies for himself as to matters subsequent to death, the
extension of his cross-examination to matters prior to death bestows complete competency upon him concerning such matters.'
116,6 Pa. 500; cf, also, Fox's Estate, 10 York 109; De Silver's Estate, 32 Super. 174; 15 Dist. 205; Belcher's Estate, 51 Pitts. 174. After
cross-examining a witness, who has testified, before he retires from the
stand the opposite party may recall him as for cross-examination, and

him generally; Houser v. Griesing, 5 Kulp 388.
so qualify
2
Clad's Estate, 214 Pa. 141; cf De Silver's Estate, 32 Super. 174.
$Boyd v. Conshohocken Mills, 149 Pa. 363.
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In an ejectment by persons claiming under a grantor now dead

against persons claiming under the grantee, the defendant testified to matters that happened subsequently to the grantor's death
only. Then the plaintiff, seeking to annul the deed, cross-examined him as to matters prior to death.

The defendant thus be-

came fully competent.1
CALLING FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION IN EARLIER
TRIAL
The calling for cross-examination may occur at an early stage
of a suit. The person so cross-examined, so made competent,
continues competent to testify at any later stage of the same proceeding. If in one trial of a case the plaintiff, an administratrix,
requires the defendant to testify to matters prior to the decedent's
death, and for some reason a second trial is had, the defendant is
The plaina fully competent witness for himself at this trial.'
tiff's calling for cross examination the defendant before arbitrators,
qualifies him to testify for himself before the jury on the appeal.'
Testimony given under compulsion in an equity proceeding qualifies the witness to testify in a subsequent proceeding at law, e. g.,
ejectment, when the parties and the issues are the same. When
parties or issues are different, however, competency in the later
proceeding is not produced. After A and wife have conveyed
land to B, and B has in turn conveyed it to C, and after B has
died, B's executors file a bill in equity to reform the deed from A
and wife with respect to the separate acknowledgment. To this
bill C, as grantee, and A and wife, the grantors, were defendants. A was called as a witness for cross-examination by the
plaintiff. This did not entitle A to testify in a later ejectment
by C against A and wife for the same land, because, says
1
Knauff v. Fryer, 23 Montg. 110. The defendant was cross-examined as to the care she had taken of the grantor and his clothes, the

money paid to her, what was done with it.
2

Bair v. Frischkorn, 151 Pa. 466.
Forrester v. Torrence, 64 Pa. 20; Shadle's Bstate, 30 Super. 151.
Suit against three, A, B and C. Before.artibrators plaintiff called A.
This made B competent before the arbitrators for the defendants.
When A died before the trial on the appeal and his administrator was
substituted, the plaintiff was made incompetent, and hence the testimony cf A before the arbitrators could not be given in evidence. Allum
v. Carroll, 67 Pa. 68.
3
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Mitchell, J., "neither the issue nor the parties were the same. In
the equity suit the appellee (C) and Weidner were co-defendants,
and Weidner was called by the plaintiffs. Appellee could not
have objected, and he was not bound by the plaintiff's waiver of
the objection."'
PROVING THE FORMER TESTIMONY
As the competency of the witness depends on his having testified as under cross-examination, in an earlier trial, it is necessary
when on the later trial he is offered, to precede the offer with evidence of his having earlier testified. If his former testimony was
delivered before an arbitrator, or a jury, one of the arbitrators 2 or
jurors may testify to the fact that he had testified under compulsion of the opposite party. Possibly the testimony having been
delivered after the death of a deceased party the proposed witness
would be competent to prove it. Consider here Ballentine v.
v. Ballentine. 3 A sci fa sur mortgage against the mortgagor and
the terre-tenant was pending. The terre-tenant filed a bill to
have the mortgage declared fraudulent as to him, a creditor of the
mortgagor. The mortgagee was called as for cross-examination
by the terre-tenaut and the bill was dismissed without prejudice
to the plaintiff's (terre-tenant's) right to defend the suit on the
mortgage on the ground of the fraud. Subsequently to the delivery of the mortgagee's testimony, the terre-tenant died, before
the trial of the scire facias. At the trial the mortgagee offered
himself to prove the testimony he had given under the bill. The
court excluded him as incompetent to testify as to matters occurring prior to the death of the terre-tenant.
DEPENDENT INCOMPETENCE REMOVED
The courts have invented the principle, despite the act of 1887,
that the incompetency of wife or husband shall be reflected upon
her or his spouse. Whatever removes the incompetency of a person
removes the derivative incompetence of his or her marital consort. The husband, e. g., being an accountant in the Orphans'
Court, to -,nose account exceptions are filed, if he is called for
cross-examination by the the exceptant, and thus made fully com'Land Company v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359.
2
Forrester v. Kline, 64 Pa. 29.

32 Mona. 333.
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petent for himself, his wife likewise becomes fully competent for
him.' "The wife's interest" says Hemphill, P.J., "is wholly and
solely derivative from and dependent upon that of her husband,
and whenever that bar is removed, whether by act of assembly,
release or the act of the adverse party, and he is made a competent witness, his wife is also." In Kinkle's Estate,2 Stewart,
J., declined to decide whether removal by cross-examination of
the incompetency of a husband also involved that of the wife's
incompetency; and in Root's ]Estate, 3 the auditor, W. T. Brown,
held that the cross-examination of a wife by the opposite party
rendering her fully competent, did not restore the competency of
the husband. It would be necessary that he should be crossexamined also.
MAKING HUSBAND OR WIFE COMPETENT

When wife or husband is dead the surviving spouse is not as
such incompetent to testify adversely to the right of the deceased.
The husband, administrator of his wife, claims certain money as
his, although it was deposited in her name. Being called by an
exceptant to his account, to testify as to matters prior to the
death of the wife, he becomes fully competent to testify that the
money is his own..4 A wife, under-similar circumstances, may
testify in support of her claim against the husband's estate.5 But
wife or husband cannot testify to confidential communications of the spouse now deceased.'
RELEVANT MATTERS

The cross- examination referred to in the act of 1887 is declared by it to make the examinee competent "as to all relevant
matters, whether or not these matters were touched upon in his
These matters are not simply those which
cross-examination."
are relevant to the special inquiries of the cross-examination.
"White's Estate, Dist. 808.
213 York 170.
311 Lane 225.
4Zichhorn's Estate, 7 CC. 433.
5
Taylor's Estate, 4 Dist. 691. Judgment against a husband. The
wife applied to have it opened. She not being cross-examined, nor her
husband was not competent to testify concerning matters prior to the
death of the plaintiff. Salsberg v. Kopcha, 10 Kulp 410.
8
Taylor's Estate, 4 Dist. 691.

10
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Exceptions to the account of an administratdr, specify matters
with which he should be surcharged. He is examined with respect to them. This qualifies him to testify to an additional
claim which he prefers at the audit for compensation under a
contract with the decedent for board, viz., of a grandson of the
deceased, the son of a brother of the administrator. "Clearly,"
says Rice, P. J., "it is not essential that his testimony relate
specifically to the subject-matter of his cross-examination, the
words of the act settle that question." Nor does it need to refer
to the issue raised by the account and the exceptions. The ultimate purpose of the audit in the Orphans' Court is to make
distribution of the estate. The testimony of the accountant is
relevant to this object, although the account did not allude to
the claim, nor did his cross-examination touch upon it.' An administratrix of her husband's estate did not charge herself in her
account with the price obtained for stock in a corporation which
had belonged to him. She alleged that he gave it to her. The
exceptant called her as on cross-examination to testify to decedent's membership in the corporation, the name in which the
stock was held at the time of his death, to whom it belonged,
etc. This qualified her to testify that the decedent had given the
stock to her.2 Exceptions to the account of an executor. He is
called for cross-examination with respect to some of the matters
excepted to. Another matter with regard to which he is not
questioned is a payment of $i5o made to an attorney. Inasmuch
as the payment had been made, the accountant was said not to be
competent to support the propriety of the attorney's claim. However, as the accountant had been examined concerning the other
subjects, he was competent to support this claim.3
WHAT IS EXAMINATION ON POST-MORTEM FACTS
The administrator files an account.

The .exceptant calls

him and asks for the production of books of account or other
writings, showing his business transactions with the decedent,
the collection of rents, and monies realized from the sales of real
estate, and the disbursements of the same. He produces books
'Shadle's Estate, No. 1; 30 Super. 151.
'Mothe's Estate, 29 Super. 462.
3
Bracken's Estate, 15 Dist. 71.
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answering the description of the call. He thus virtually affirms
the facts stated in the books. He becomes a competent witness for himself as to all relevant matters, whether mentioned in
the book or not.'
EXAMINATION AS TO BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRIES
At common law, a party, while generally incompetent, was
competent to prove that a book produced was his book of original
entries; that the entries were made by him and were made at the
time of their date. By so doing he did not expose himself without his consent to be cross-examined by the opposite party as to
other matters, 2 nor did the cross-examination of him make him
competent. But, when a party is required by the opposite party
to produce books kept by himself containing an account of
transactions with a deceased person, to be used as evidence, the
books not being books of original entries, and not offered by the
person who kept them, or in behalf of' whom they were kept,
they are virtually the testimony of the keeper, procured by the
opposite party by cross. examination, and the keeper is made fully
competent. 3 Distribution of the estate of a dead person. A claim
was made against it on a note and a book account. The claimant was called to prove the book of original entries. The crossexamination was not confined to the book, but extended to an
alleged settlement, and to the value of the services. Subsequently
his own counsel called him for the purpose of contradicting
another witness. He should have been allowed to testify, because
by carrying the cross-examination beyond the subject of the book
of original entries, and going into the settlement of the account
and of the matters entering thereinto, the witness was to be regarded as if he had been called for cross examination by the antagonist party. '
'Yeager's &state, 31 Super. 202. Under modern legislation a party
may prove his book of original entries, despite the death of the person
to be affected adversely. He can be cross-examined with respect to
the handwriting of these entries and to the dates when they were
made, without qualifying him generally as a witness. Houser v.
Griesing, 5 Kulp. 388.
2
Shaw v. Levy, 17 S. & R. 99.
3
Yeager's Estate, 31 Super. 202.
'Fox's Estate, 10 York 109.
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QUALIFYING CO-PLAINTIFFS OR CO-DEFENDANTS

The seventh section of the act of May 23d, 1887, P. L. 16o,
provides that by calling a witness disqualified by interest to testify
for himself the party calling him qualifies him fully to testify for
himself. It adds: "and also where one of several plaintiffs or defendants, or the person for whose immediate benefit such proceeding is prosecuted or defended, or such other person having
an adverse interest, is cross-examined under this section, his
co-plaintiffs or co-defendants shall thereby become fully competent witnesses on their own behalf as to all relevant matters,
whether or not these matters were touched upon in such crossexamination." Something can be said in defense of the policy
of refusing to allow one who calls a person as a witness, subse-

quently to object to him as incompetent on the ground of interest,
or on other grounds, when he is offered by the opposite party.
Having been accredited he shall not be discredited by the same
person. But how calling one of a group of plaintiffs or defendants is a declaration that all his co-parties are worthy of credit,
is incapable of being perceived. Nevertheless, the wise men who
create our laws have created this principle. To affirm the competence, the worthiness of belief, of A, is to affirm the competence,
the worthiness of belief of his associates B, C, D, E. Credibility
inheres in groups.

One of a group cannot have it unless all have.

A possible defense of the policy may be that the co-parties would
be at the mercy of their associate, who is cajoled, or bribed, or
otherwise influenced to testify for their antagonist, unless they
were qualified by his testimony for the antagonist, to testify
against him. A widow sues for funeral benefits a lodge of the
Independent Order of Odd Fellows. The defense was that the
husband had been expelled. The widow called one of the members of the lodge to testify for her. This made him and all the
other members fully competent to testify for the lodge.' The
1

Dodd v. Armstrong, 2 CC. 352. The answer to the objection to the
witnesses was: (a) The plaintiff was not claiming under or through her
deceased husband. (b) If she was, the calling by the plaintiff of one
member of the lodge qualified all to testify for themselves. When one
of several co-defendants is called for cross-examination by the plaintiff, he becomes fully competent to testify for the other defendants.
The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 Super. 170.
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fact that there are six co-defendants, one of whom is denying
that he is liable, as not being a partner, does not preclude the
cross-examination of another of the defendants by the plaintiff.'
CAIJ.1NG TO TESTIFY TO MATTERS SUBSEQUENT
TO DEATH
When the witness, who is competent to testify to matters occurring subsequent to death, though not as to matters prior to
death, is called concerning the former he is not made competent
with respect to matters that occurred before death. He seems to
have two kinds of credibility. By calling him for post-mortem
matters, his credibility touching such matters generally would be
certified to by the calling party, but there would be no certification of his credibility with regard to ante-mortem facts. The
executor of a decedent as plaintiff icalled the defendant to testify
to matters subsequent to death. He did not thus qualify the defendant to testify to matters prior to death.' So, examining the
accountant of a dead man's estate, in the Orphans' Court, with
regard to occurrences after death, does not qualify the accountant with regard to occurrences before death.'
Certain judges for
a time apparently doubted whether calling to testify concerning
matters subsequent to death would not generally qualify the witness, even as to ante-mortem matters. In 19o6, Rice, P. J., remarked: "We are not prepared to decide that the accountant
would not have been competent to testify in his own behalf as to
matters occurring in the lifetime of the decedent, even if the
party calling him for cross-examination had confined his examination strictly to matters occurring after the death of the decedent."' Ashman, J., in i886, refrained from deciding the
same question. '
'The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 Super. 170. In suit of A against B,
C and D, A calls B as a witness. He thus qualifies C and D to testify
for themselves. But if B should die before any later trial, so that A is
rendered incompetent, the testimony of C and D for themselves is inadmissible, as is also the former testimony of B. Allum v. Carroll, 67
Pa. 68.,
2Bair v. Frischkorn, 151 Pa. 466; Danley v. Danley, 179 Pa. 170.

'De Silver's Estate, 32 Super. 174; Bierly's Estate, 8132 Pa. 419.
4Shadle's Estate No. 1, 30 Super. 151. The accountant, after being
called for cross-examination by an exceptant, and examined in reference to some ante-mortem facts, was for that reason held fully competent to testify for himself.
5
Eichhorn's Estate, 7 CC. 433.
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WHEN THE WITNESS MADE COMPETENT MAY
TESTIFY

The witness who is called for cross-examination by an antagonist party, and thus made fully competent, can be at once questioned by his own counsel upon the matters concerning which he
has just testified.' He cannot, however, testify as to other matters, until his own turn to put in evidence has arrived. Where
the defendant is called by the opposite party for cross-examination, it is not error for the trial judge to refuse to permit the introduction of the defendant's main defense, by examination on
matters which have not been opened in his testimony already
elicited.' An action was brought for compensation for plastering
done under oral contracts. The points in dispute were whether
plaintiff was to furnish some of the material and what credits the
defendant was entitled to. The plaintiff called the defendant and
examined him concerning the terms of the contracts and the work
done under them, but not concerning payments made on account.
Defendant's counsel then immediately endeavored to elicit from
him the payments he had made and other matters not "opened
up" by his previous examination. The court properly refused
to allow the questions. But when the time came for putting in
his defense, he testified for himself.3
CROSS-EXAMINATION DOES NOT RENDER PRE.
VIOUSLY DELIVERED TESTIMONY COMPETENT
When one who claims against the estate of a dead man is ex-

amined for himself, but does not confine his testimony to matters
that occurred subsequently to the death, the party who represents the deceased may properly cross-examine upon the antemortem matters testified to, without waiving his right to exclude
the evidence from consideration. A claimant called to support
her claim that certain jewelry had been given to her by the deceased, was objected to as incompetent. Her counsel then stated
that he did not intend to ask her as to any matter that took
'The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 Super. 170.
'Corkery v. O'Neill, 9 Super. 335.
'Corkery v. O'Neill, 9 Super. 335. The defendant, however, was a
fully competent witness for himself, independently of his being called
by the plaintiff as for cross-examination.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
place before death. He, however, extended his examination to
matters preceding death. The auditing judge examined her
even more fully as to such matters. This justified a cross-examination upon the same matters, without giving validity to the testimony. Such cross-examination is not a waiver of the objection.
The court properly disregdrded the testimony concerning antemortem occurrences.'
CROSS-EXAMINATION UPON THE CROSSEXAMINATION

When one party calls the opposite for cross-examination the
latter may cross-examine himself upon the same subjects. When
one party calls one of several defendants to testify for him, the
other co-defendants have a right to cross-examination with respect to the matters elicited. They are not bound to call the
witness as their own.
It is error for the court to exclude a
question which the co-defendants wished to address to him,
without ascertaining that it did not relate to the subjects touched
on in theplaintiff's examination.' Under the act of March 27, 1865,
assumpsit for work done, defendant called the plaintiff as a witness.
He was examined by the defendant, and then cross-examined by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel then called him, and he
was examined for himself, and then cross-examined by the defendant. He had become a fully competent witness by the defendant's examining him.' If the defendant calls one of several
plaintiffs as for cross-examination, the co-plaintiffs have a right
to cross-examine him. Hence if the defendant takes the deposition of one of the plaintiffs, and having examined him refuses to
produce him for continued examination on the same subjects by
his co-plaintiff, or, possibly, with respect to his motives, bias, in
giving the testimony, the testimony will be disregarded.'
'De Silver's Estate, 32 Super. 174. In Kinkle's Estate, 13 York 170,
a son claimed against the estate of his father. Though clearly incompetent he testified in support of his claim. He was then cross-examined with
respect to the claim. It was strangely supposed by the court that this
cross-examination rendered his testimony competent. Steward, P. J.
2
The Scrantonian v. Brown, 36 Super. 170.
'Seip v. Storch, 52 Pa. 210.
'Gunnis v. Abbett, 17 W. N. 424.
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DEPOSITION

If a defendant takes the deposition of the plaintiff, or one of
several plaintiffs, and files it, but declines to read it, the plaintiff
may use the deposition. The simple taking of the deposition is
a certificate of the credibility of the defendant.' The same principle applies when the plaintiff, having taken the deposition of
the defendant, does not produce it. The defendant may testify
for himself.2
'O'Connor v. Amer. Iron Mountain Co. 56 Pa. 234.
2
Bennett v. Williams, 57 Pa. 404. In Davenport's £state, 4 Kulp.
231. M claimed against the estate of X, now dead. In order to show a
set-off against M's claim, the widow was offered as a witness. It was
mistakenly assumed that she was incompetent, but that she had been
made competent by M's calling her to testify.
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MOOT COURT
CARPENTER v. JONES
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts submitted in the above case are substantially as follows:
Carpenter came to Carlisle via the Cumberland Valley Railroad.
At the station, Jones was soliciting jobs hauling trunks of the incoming passengers. Carpenter employed Jones to haul his trunks to the
hotel. Jones, on the way to the hotel, was attacked by a crowd of union
men who were angry because Jones had refused to join their union.
Carpenter's trunks and their contents were entirely destroyed by these
men. Carpenter was a traveling salesman for a shoe firm and the
trunks contained his samples.
Means for Plaintiff.
Voorhis for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
a carrier is sued for a breach of a legal duty, the first
KOLB, J.-If
thing to be determined is whether he is a common or a private carrier,
for the status must first be determined before the duty can be known to
exist. A common carrier is one who, by virtue of his calling, undertakes, for compensation, to transport personal property from one place
to another for all such as may choose to employ him, and every one
who undertakes to carry for compensation the goods of all persons, indifferently is, as to liability, to be deemed a common carrier. 158 N. Y.
34; 172 Pa. 586. There is, therefore, little doubt that the defendant in
this case was a common carrier.
It follows that the burden was on the defendant in seeking to escape liability for the goods destroyed, to show that the loss was to be
referred to some one of the exceptions to the common law rule. In the
effort to do this, the defendant has utterly failed. The theory advanced
by the defendants was that the goods having been destroyed by strikers,
that this constituted an act by a public enemy, hence defendant was
not liable. True that a common carrier is not liable for damages resulting from acts of God or a public enemy; but can this act be conThe authorities seem to be practisidered that of a public enemey?
cally one way in this regard. Where there is a total failure to deliver
goods, occasioned by the depredations or the violence of mobs, rioters,
strikers, thieves, etc., the carrier is liable; for by the word "enemy" in
this connection is to be understood the public enemies of the country of
the carrier and not of the owner of the goods. 8 W. N. C. 269; 102 N.
Y. 563; 2 N. Y. 204.
In t'he case at bar, Jones, as a common carrier, in taking Carpenter's trunks, agreed to convey them safely to the hotel. In so doing
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the trunks and their contents were destroyed. The destruction of
the trunks and their contents was accomplished neither by an act of
God nor a public enemy. This being the case, we see no reason why the
verdict should not be for the plaintiff. We base our conclusion upon
the authorities cited and for reasons which are plain without the citation of any authorities.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPBRIOR COURT
A common carrier is generally liable for the delivery of goods intrusted to him for carriage in the condition in which he received them.
If they are totally destroyed, he must pay the shipper their value. If
they are injured, he must compensate the shipper for their deterioration.
There are some exceptions. The injury may be the result of an
"act of God," or of the acts of a public enemy. In this case, the injury
was due to neither.
"Losses by thieves and robbers, strikers, rioters,
and the like, do no fall within the exception." Hale, Bailments, p. 364;
6 Cyc. 379. In Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, Holt, C. J., observed,
"though the force be ever so great, as if an irresistible multitute of
people should rob him (the carrier), nevertheless he is chargeable."
The justification of the rule is not altogether satisfactory. It
would be eminently proper to compel the carrier to exonerate himself by
the most convincing proof that the injury or destruction of the goods
was caused by the acts of persons which he could not prevent or successfully oppose. It seems not so just to hold the carrier liable for a
loss whose provenance he clearly shows td have been an uncontrollable
power, whether impersonal or personal.
The only debatable question is, whether the defendant is to be
deemed a common carrier. Such carrier is defined "one who undertakes, for hire or reward, to transport the goods of such as choose to
employ him, from place to place." 6 Cyc. 365. Jones was at the railroad station soliciting jobs of hauling trunks of incoming passengers.
We think he may be deemed a common carrier. He announced himself
ready to convey the goods of any of the passengers. We do not know
whether he had ever done this before, or whether he ever did it afterwards.
But, apparently, it is not necessary that he should have previously or
subsequently conveyed goods. A farmer who once applied for the
hauling of goods from Lewistown to Bellefonte was made liable for
the value of the goods when lost while in his custody. Gibson, C. J.,
observed: "The defendant is a farmer, but has occasionally done jobs
as a carrier. That, however, is immaterial. He applied for the transportation of these goods, as a matter of business, and consequently on
the usual conditions," viz., that he should be an insurer of the safety of
the goods, except when their loss or injury was due to the act of God,
or to a few other causes. Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 W. & S. 285.
Affirmed.
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GAS COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A leak occurred in the pipes conducting gas through Temple's shop,
by the negligence of the gas company. A large quantity of the gas
escaped, and the tenant of the-shop in endeavoring to find the leak unwisely used a lamp. The result was an explosion which shattered the
building, causing a loss of $2000. Defense is that tenant is liable.
McCann for Plaintiff.
Fine for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VOORHIS, J.-It
is admitted that the leak in the gas pipes occurred
through the negligence of the gas company. There also seems to be
no doubt that the act of the tenant in looking for the leak with i lighted
lamp was contributory negligence on his part. 99 Pa. 1 holds that it is
contributory negligence for a man to search for a gas leak with a light
such as a candle or lamp. The next question, and the one on which this
case hinges, is whether the contributory negligence of the tenant can
be imputed to the landlord.
The doctrine of imputed negligence is not law at all in some states,
while in other states it is in force to a limited extent. 29 Cyc. 542 says
that the following doctrine is the law of Conn., Ill., Iowa, Minnesota
and N. Y.: "Negligence in the conduct of another will not be imputed
to the person injured if he neither authorized such conduct nor participated therein nor had the right or power to control the conduct of such
person." This rule certainly could not include the relation of landlord
and tenant within its scope where the tenant did not act under the
order or authority of the landlord.
Mass., Rhode Island and West Virginia seem to be the only states
in which the rule, that the contributory negligence of a tenant can be
imputed to his landlord, is in force. There is a case in 122 Mass. 209
which is a case like the one before us. It was there held that the negligence of a tenant could be imputed to his landlord so as to bar the
landlord's recovery. There is also a case in 24 R. I. 292 which holds the
same as the Mass. case.
Notwithstanding the above authority we do not think the doctrine
that the negligence of a tenant is imputable to his landlord, is the law
of Pa. There seem to be no cases reported that are exactly in point
with the one in question. There is a dictum in 4 Superior Ct. 385 to the
effect that the contributory negligence of a tenant cannot be imputed
to his landlord so as to bar the recovery of the latter from a third person. 134 Pa. 335 holds that the negligence of a tenant cannot be imputed to the landlord.
Another reason which makes this court think that the above doctrine
is not the law of -Pa. is the fact that the negligence of a parent is not
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imputable to his child in this state. There is a case in 8 Gray (Mass.)
123, Hally v. Boston Gas Light Co., which holds, that negligence of the
father is attributable to his infant. This shows that Mass. is very fond
of the doctrine of imputed negligence and uses it whenever possible.
We think the above Mass. case would have been decided differently in
Pa., for as before stated, the rule that the negligence of the father is
attributable to his infant is not in force in Pa.
It might be contended that this doctrine of imputed negligence as
between landlord and tenant is peculiar to gas cases. We do not think
this is so in all states though it may be in some. In Richmond Gas
Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600, it was held in a gas explosion case that the
negligence of the landlord will not be imputed to a resident of the
house where the resident and lanldlord's family live together in the
house damaged. Of course, this case is not exactly like the one in
question, but we think it sufficiently indicates that the doctrine of imputed negligence as between tenant and landlord would not be considered by the courts of Ind. even in gas cases.
By reviewirig the above authorities it can be readily seen that the
authorities are in conflict. It is also plain that the doctrine of imputed
negligence is received very cautiously in some states, while in others
it is enforced very freely.- There is dictum in Pa. to the effect that
the contributory negligence of a tenant can not be imputed to a landlord
so as to bar the latter's recovery. There is also a case in Pa. which
holds that the negligence of tenant is not imputable to landlord.
Considering the conflict of authorities the attitude of Pa. towards
the imputed negligence doctrine and the dictum in a comparatively recent case, we think the contributory negligence of the tenant cannot be
imputed to the landlord, and that the plaintiff can recover. We therefore
give judgment for plaintiff in sum of $2000 and costs.

OPINION OF SUPREMF4 COURT
The conclusion reached by the learned court below is sufficiently
justified by its opinion:
The defendant was negligent. But for that negligence the disaster
to the shop would not have occurred. The negligent act was sufficiently
near to the effect. It made possible (a) the diffusion of the inflammable
gas through the building, (b) the explosion from the application of heat.
It is true that the explosion that actually occurred would not have
occurred but for the negligent act of the tenant. But for his'negligence
the plaintiff is in no sense responsible. The act was not foreseen. It
could not have been prevented by the plaintiff. A landlord has no right
or power to be on the leased premises and to supervise the acts of the
tenant. Cf. Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas Co., 115 Pac. 313.
The judgment, therefore, must be affirmed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

21

HARPER v. HOOVER
Alteration of Check-Bank's Liability
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The holder of a check for $60 raised the sum to $160 and endorsed it
to Moover in payment of a suit of clothes costing $80. Hoover not having money at hand to pay the change, asked Harper to cash it. Harper
did so and received the check without Hoover's endorsement. When
Harper presented the check to the bank, the bank discovering the alteration, refused to pay it. Harper sues Hoover to recover the amount of
the check.
Burd for Plaintiff.
Saul for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WESTOVER, J.-The check is a negotiable instrument under the
Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901, Sec. 1, P. L. 194.
By act of 1901, P, L. 199, an instrument is negotiated when it is
transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by the delivery; if payable to order, it is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder, completed by the delivery.
Endorsements may be special or in blank. If special, the check
must be endorsed by the party to whom it has been endorsed in order to
further make it negotiable. An endorsement in blank specifies no endorsee and the instrument so endorsed is payable to bearer and may be
negotiated by delivery.
From the facts, we have assumed that Hoover has taken the check
into his possession and is more than a mere bystander, who being asked
to cash a check, and unable, refers the holder thereof to another. The
facts warrant the assumption that Hoover became the owner of the
check for the time being, and finding that he could not immediately
make change, secured another to cash it for him. The plaintiff has the
same rights as a party across the street would have had if the defendant
had gone out of the store to get the check cashed. There may be some
doubt as to whether the endorsement in the case is special or in blank.
The facts say, "endorsed it to Hoover." This may mean that the endorsement read, "Pay to Hoover,II and was signed thereunder by the holder. If
the check was signed in this manner, it was no longer negotiable until
endorsed by Hoover. But, by act of 1911, P. L. 200, the holder could
compel the endorsement if the check was transferred without Hoover's
endorsement, and in that case Hoover would be liable for the full
amount of the check as an endorser.
If the check was endorsed in blank by the holder to Hoover, it could
be negotiated by delivery. By sect. 65 of act of 1901, P. L. 203, every
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person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified endorsement warrants that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what
it purports to be.
This check is not what it purported to be. By sect. 125 of act of
1901, the alternation of this check was a material one.
By sect. 124, act of 1901, the holder of a materially altered check,
not a party to the alteration may enforce payment thereof according to
its original tenor.
The ordinary manner of endorsement is in blank. We hold this
check to have been so endorsed according to the facts given. Harper can
recover $60 on the check at the bank, and for the balance of $100 Hoover
is liable on his implied warranty.
Counsel for plaintiff in facts stated in his brief has not sued for
breach of warranty. The counsel for defendant has assumed that Harper has not his action for the whole amount of 'the check. By the briefs,
therefore, we have two sets of facts.
Judgment is given plaintiff for $100, defendant's liability for breach
of implied warranty.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
After a careful examination of this case, we have concluded that the
judgment of the learned court below should be affirmed.
The check remained valid for $60, in the hands of Harper, against
its drawer, since Harper was a bona fide holder in due course. Although Hoover did not endorse the check, he sold it, and like the seller
of any personal propery, he warranted his title. He warranted that he
had a right, through the check, to receive from the drawer $160. He
warranted, as sect. 115 of the act of 1901 expresses the bbligation, "that
the instrument is genuine, and in all respects what it purports to be."
For breach of this warranty, the price paid for the instrument, or so
much of it as will equal the loss arising from its defects, may be recovered.
There may be a question, whether Harper had not a right to recover
$160 from Hoover, on his tendering back the check. Only he, however,
could complain in this court of the limitation of his recovery to $100.
Affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. FERRIS
Burglary-Alibi-Preponderance of Evidence
STATEME4NT OF FACTS
Ferris is tried for burglary. His parents, four brothers and two
sisters all testify that he was home the whole of the night during which
the burglary was committed. Two citizens, however, swear that he was
40 feet from the house where the burglary was committed, going toward
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the house at 10:30 p. in., and one of the articles, a pistol, stolen from the
house was found in his possession two days subsequently. The lower
court allowed the jury to convict.
Snyder for Prosecution.
Wallick for Defendant.
OPINION OF TH4 COURT
TOBIAS, J.-This is a motion for a new trial. The defense rests
on what is known in law as an alibi and contends that the court erred
in allowing the jury to convict because it was clearly shown that he was
at home when the burglary was committed, and it is evident that he
could not be at home and at the place where the crime was committed
at one and the same time. Judge Agnew in Briceland v. Commonwealth, 74 Pa. 463, states that, "when a defense rests on proof of an
alibi, it must cover the time when the offense is shown to have been
committed so as to preclude the possibility of the prisoner's presence at
the place of the crime; for if it be possible that he could have been at
both places, the proof of the alibi is valueless." This same idea is expressed in Commonwealth v. MvcMahon, 145 Pa. 413, and in Commonwealth v. Gutshall, 22 Superior 269.
The indictment does not state that the burglary was committed at
any specified time, but that it may have been committed at any time
during the night. Therefore the defense must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ferris was at home the whole of that night, and to prove
it the defense relies wholly on the statements of his parents, brothers
and sisters. However, their evidence was purely negative and may have
been given for personal reasons. They declared that he was at home
the whole of the night because he was there when they retired and when
they arose the following morning. They did not say that they saw him
at any time during the night, and there was plenty of time for him to
have gone to the house where the burglary was committed and returned
during the interval. On the other hand, two citizens swore that they
saw him at 10:30 p. in., 40 feet from the house, and going toward it.
Their evidence was positive and had to carry with it much weight.
And as he gave no good reason for having the pistol in his possession two days after the burglary was committed, we feel that the alibi
as a complete defense failed. And if it raised any doubt in the minds
of the jurors, this doubt was cleared away when they examined all the
evidence in the case, including that which related to the alibi; and from
the whole evidence, returned their verdict of guilty. They were satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that the burglary was committed;
second, that Geo. Ferris, the prisoner, was the man who committed the
burglary.
There was no doubt as to the first proposition; and to prove the
second one, the pistol was offered as evidence. It was good evidence,
because, when it has been proved that a burglary has taken place, and
the stolen property, or some of it, has been sufficiently identified, it is
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admissible for the state, in order that it may connect the defendant with
the burglary, to prove that he was shortly afterwards found in possession
of the property stolen at the time of the burglary, and to introduce the
property itself in evidence. This idea is set forth in Commonwealth
v. McGorty, 114 Mass., 299, which holds, that recent possession of property stolen at the commission of a burglary is presumptive evidence of
guilt to be weighed by a jury. In State, v. Brewster, 7 Vermont 112,
it was held, that, if stolen goods are found in the possession of the
prisoner, it is a question for the jury, how far, under all circumstances,
that possession raises a presumption of guilt in the particular case.
In Pennsylvania the rule is, that when there is evidence which alone
would justify an inference of the disputed fact in favor of the party on
whom the burden of proof rests (the state in this case), it must go to the
jury no matter how strong may be the countervailing proof. This fact
is set forth in Pratt v. Richards Jewelry Co., 69 Pa. 53, which states
as follows: "It is not within the province of the court to say whether a
given offer would actually prove the fact it was offered to prove, provided its tendency be to prove that fact. If it, with other facts in the
case, tends to establish a result material to be established by the party
offering it, it should be admitted, and go to the jury. It is for 'them to
pass on it under instructions from the court."
A case very similar to the one under coisideration, is State v. Brady,
91 N. H. 801, decided in 1902. The evidence for the state tended to show
that on Sept. 29, 1900, the barn of Stuart, situated several miles east of
the city of Des Moines, was unlawfully broken and entered, and certain
harness stolen therefrom; that on the said night the defendant was seen
upon the public highway in that neighborhood; that abqut ten days
thereafter the stolen property, or some of it, was found in his possession; and that he made some statements or admissions serving to
strengthen the suspicion of his guilt. The defendant denied his guilt
and offered considerable evidence tending to prove an alibi, and explained
his possession of the harness by the statement that he bought it of a
person who brought it to his house in Des Moines on the morning after
the alleged crime, which statement was also corroborated by several
witnesses. Among the instructions given by the court to the jury was
the following: "Thepossession of property that has been recently stolen
from a building by means of breaking and entering said building is sufficient to raise a presumption of guilt of the person in whose possession
said property is found; that is, it creates the presumption that he is the
party that broke and entered said building, and took therelrom the said
property, unless the attending circumstances or evidence explains said
possession, and shows that the same may have been otherwise honestly
acquired."
The fact that the pistol was found on his person, and no satisfactory
reason for having it in his possession was given, is prima facie evidence
of his guilt.
The motion for a new trial is refused.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The evidence submitted to the jury was sufficient to sustain the
verdict rendered by it.
With all that is said by the learned court below, concerning the
nature of the evidence of an alibi, we are unable to agree. The burden
of proving guilt is on the Commonwealth. Guilt, in this case, consists
in several facts, one of which was presence at the scene of the alleged
burglary at the time. Ferris was not guilty unless he entered the house
of the prosecutor on the night mentioned in the indictment. The jury
must be put by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt, that he was then
there. It is enough, then, for the evidence of the alibi to put or to keep
the jury in reasonable doubt of this, 2 Trickett, Crim. Law 986, et seq.
The doctrine of the opinion overruling the motion for a new trial if
embodied in the charge to the jury, would, in our opinion, have required
a reversal of the conviction.
The parents, brothers and sisters testified under a manifest bias in
favor of the defendant. Only the jury could appraise the effect of it upon their veraciousness. The learned court below, appositely suggests,
that even if correct, they may have been mistaken, for the fact that their
son and brother was at home at the beginning of the night, and at the
rising hour, was not decisive that he had not been from home in the interval.
The possession two days after the burglary of a pistol that had been
stolen at the time that crime was committed and therefore probably by
the burglar, was a circumstance, which unexplained to the satisfaction of the jury, would naturally and properly have weight, 2 Crim. Law,
902; 1 Crim. Law, 160.
Seeing no error in the reception of evidence, or in the instructions
given to the jury, the judgment must be affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN RONALD
STATEFMENT OF CASE
Ronald accused Henry Smith of the murder of X, who died. Smith
was tried for murder, and Ronald, with two other whom he had suborned,
testified that Smith had inflicted the injuries upon X which killedhim.
Smith was convicted and executed. Ronald is now indicted for the
murder of Smith.

OPINION OF THE COURT
The first question for the court to consider in regard to the case at
bar is whether this was murder. Murder at common law is when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable
creature in being and under the peace of the commonwealth, with malice afore-thought or implied.
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By the statute of Pennsylvania, "all murder which shall be perpetrated by means of lying in wait, by means of poison, or by any other
kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing."-Act March 31st,
1860. P. L. 382.
The first thing is the intent to kill. Every voluntary action or
omission, which indirectly or directly causes death, is in the eye of the
law, the manifestation of an intent to kill.
The doctrine is that every person must be presumed to have foreseen
and intended all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary
acts. Thus one who, from any motive whatever, neglects a legal duty
whereby he evidently puts at hazard the lives of others; or who performs
an aft which a series of secondary causes, not depending on extraordinary
and unforeseeable conditions, produces death, not only is guilty of the
act of killing, but also of the intent to kill. Robinson's Blementary
Law, Ph. 528.
Ronald accused Smith of murder and suborned two witnesses to
swear that he killed X, therefore Ronald neglected his legal duty,
which was to tell the truth, and put Smith's life at hazard. Thus this
act, through a series of secondary causes, such as the machinery of the
law, producing the death of Smith, makes him responsible for Smith's
death, with intent to kill.
Perjury, or subornation of perjury, at one time was punishable by
death. At the present time it is a misdemeanor at common law and is
punishable by fine and imprisonment. Pa. St. Act, March 31, 1860.
P. L. 283, § 14, holds that if a'ny person procure or suborn any other
person to make any such oath or affirmation, every person so offending
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
In some states, such as Georgia, Vermont and others, it is held to
be a felony to cause by perjury a conviction of some crimes by statute.
In Vermont the statute provides "that a witness who wilfully and
corruptly and with intent to take away the life of a person, bears false
testimony against him, and thereby causes such person's life to be
taken, shall suffer the punishment of death."-State v. Fournier, 68 Vt.
262.
Ronald is clearly guilty of a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania and by
common law, and of murder by the Vermont laws.
He committed a misdemeanor malum 'in se, which caused the death
of Smith, therefore by that principle of law he is responsible for the
death of Smith.
He had the intent to kill Smith, and being responsible for his death
through the machinery of law, he is guilty of murder.
This is not too remote. The testimony convinced the jury, and the
judge's sentence and the execution are all directly brought about by
their testimony and can be considered one proximate act, the act of the
law.
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OPINION OF SUPRZME COURT
It is with regret that we are constrained to reverse the judgment in
this case. The defendant intended that Smith should die. He selected a means. The means was successful. Morally he is as guilty
as if he had killed Smith with poison, or a gun, or a stiletto. The
difficulty we experience in sustaining the conviction is, that it is
seemingly in opposition to the long running and broad current of the
decisions.
There are cases which hold that one who injures another by perjury
in a civil action, cannot be made liable to the person injured in an ac
tion for the wrong. In Davenport v. Sympson, 1 Croke FBliz. 520, A had
sued B for breaking a "fountain of silver," A claiming 5001. as damages.
The defendant B, a witness in that case, testified that the fountain was
worth only 180 1. The result was that A obtained a verdict of but 2001.,
thus suffering a loss of 300 1. The court gave judgment for the defendant, observing that there was no punishment for perjury at common
law. Now there is a punishment furnished by the statute of 5 EZIiz. C.
9. If this action should be allowed, the defendant might be twice punished, that is, in the prosecution under this statute and in the civil
action. If there were a liability in this action, "there would be some
precedent for it before this time, but, being there is not any precedent
found therefor, it is a good argument that the action is not maintainable." If a witness could be punished for perjury, "every witness
would be drawn in question." Similar considerations, in addition to
deference to precedent, have induced frequent similar decisions.-Cunningham v. Brown, 18 Vt. 123; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns 157; Cf. Homer
v. Schinstock, 80 Kans. 136; 18 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, p. 21, and note.
[In Oakdale Borough v. Gamble, 201 Pa. 289, the question, though involved in the facts, was not considered.]
As for the loss of money, or other property, through a judgment secured by means of perjured evidence, no civil remedy is furnished
against the perjurers, so, when a man is by means of false testimony
convicted of a crime and made to suffer its penalty, has he no redress.
In Eyres v. Sedgewicke, Cro. Jac. 601, 18 Am. & 4ng. Ann. Cases 25,
a man who by the false oath of another had been convicted and punished,
brought an action against the false swearer for damages. The court
disallowed a recovery, adopting, apparently, the argument of counsel
as its ground. The testimony of a witness is assumed to be true until
it is proved false, and then only in an indictment for perjury. It
would be mischievous to permit the truth of an oath to be tried by an
action on the case. If the charged perjury should ebe examined in an
action on the case, then, probably one witness would swear against
that which the other had sworn, and so there would be oath against
oath. The law could not know which of them was true. The law,
therefore, will not suffer such an inconvenience. The perjury ought
to be punished by conviction upon indictment therefor.
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If then, the person who suffers loss of property or liberty, by means
of a judgment or conviction- procured by perjured testimony, has no
redress against the perjurer, it is difficult to see how he is to be punished at the suit of the state, for such loss, and if there is no redress
for loss of property or liberty, how should there be for loss of life,
through the judgment of the court?
The crime of perjury often has serious consequences, and it would
be a sensible policy, in punishing it, to vary the punishment with the
gravity of those consequences. The learned court below has shown
that in Vermont there is a statute which provides that one who by perjured testimony procures the conviction of another of a capital offense,
in consequence of which such other suffers death, shall suffer the punishment of death. State v. Fournier, 68 Vt. 262. This is more sensible
than the adoption of an invariable penalty for perjury, without reference
to the gravity of the results, or to the existence or not of an intention to
injure another. Perjury to save life is surely not as atrocious as perjury to destroy it. All perjury in Pennsylvania is called a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, and an imprisonment not exceeding seven years. For the crime of which the defendant is guilty, this is no adequate punishment. It does not follow that
the courts are at libertyto entertain prosecutions of the perjurer for murder, when he has procured a capital conviction, or suits for damages
when le has procured the imprisonment, or the loss of property of the
person against whom he has testified.
Were Ronald indicted for the perjury, he could not be convicted,
except on the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness with corroboration, to the untruth of his evidence given under oath. It does
not appear that the protection of this or any equivalent principle was
extended to him. If Ronald could not be fined and imprisoned for
seven years on the unsupported testimony of one witness, it would be
scandalous to allow him to suffer death in consequence of such testimony.
The judgment must be reversed.

